UVF Ceasefire: 10 years on

By Craig Ferguson

In 1994 I was a naive researcher trying to pull something together for a piece of research on the Ulster Volunteer Force. With little experience of life at the ‘hard end’ of the conflict I was lucky to be guided by experienced ex-prisoners and volunteers. In the months before the ceasefire they made me aware of the years of dialogue undertaken by UVF prisoners in Long Kesh Camp and of the endeavours on the outside by the Volunteer Political Party and later the Progressive Unionist Party to project the organisation into politics. As the research unfolded I became aware that a hidden peace process had developed within Loyalism that was just as important as the Hume, Adams and Reynolds dialogue.

This process of internal debate came to fruition in the Loyalist ceasefire of 1994 that brought to the political stage politicians such as David Ervine, Billy Hutchinson, Gary McMichael, David Adams and others. These were new types of Unionists, many of whom had been through the prison system and therefore were not an easy push over. The ceasefire ,therefore, opened an opportunity to introduce fresh voices into Unionism that spoke from the experience of conflict. To those Unionist politicians who had used and abused paramilitaries in the past this was seen as a threat. Some of the older Unionists remembered that spark of independence and practical socialist thinking that had emerged in the summer of 1974. So from day one the Loyalist ceasefire was seen as a threat to traditional conservative Unionism. Indeed it has been said by some loyalists that certain ‘constitutional’ politicians sought to persuade them not to call a ceasefire.

These new Loyalist politicians had an analysis of the conflict that illustrated how working-class Protestant communities had paid a heavy price in human, social, economic and territorial terms. Their analysis was, however, not towards victory over the enemy, namely physical force Republicanism, but in the right circumstances co-existence. In a similar manner to the Israeli delegates at the Camp David peace summit in the 1970’s, the Loyalists were prepared to sit down and try and work out a way to end the violence. At Camp David former enemies such as Sadat of Egypt and Begin of Israel ultimately broke the barrier of political deadlock. However, military history teaches that a ceasefire can be called for strategic reasons rather than for genuine peace making. This observation can be made about the Republican ceasefire.

Political deadlock in Northern Ireland always seems to dramatically impact upon the grass roots Loyalist community. Internal feuds, communities destroyed from within by social and economic deprivation, and political marginalization has developed in tandem with the ‘peace’ process. Once proud areas have become stigmatised and isolated as the word “Loyalism” is unfairly linked to gangsterism, drugs and vice. As one PUP spokesperson recently wrote, “Loyalists have become stigmatised as the poor white trash of Europe”. The Loyalist ceasefire and the emerging Loyalist politicians became a plaything for Governments with an agenda that essentially used them as pawns in a process aimed at ‘sanitising’ Republicanism and achieving some measure of decommissioning.

In 1994-1998, it appeared that progress was possible and an intricate process of negotiations unfolded leading to exploratory and subsequently all party talks at Castle Buildings. All the way through this complex diplomatic process the PUP tried to play progressive roles by presenting papers on social, economic, cultural and community development issues. The PUP argued for the Sharing of Responsibility between parties to build a stable assembly at Stormont. In 1998 the Belfast Agreement was signed and dramatically prisoner releases unfolded and changes progressively emerged in society with legislation passed surrounding such sensitive areas as human rights and policing.

The peace process as presented in the Belfast Agreement was, however, not supported by the vast majority of Unionism. In the all-party talks the seats of the DUP were absent and consequently that party did not endorse the Agreement. The Agreement was strenuously opposed by a number of other Unionists and the commitment to the spirit of the Agreement by many who had endorsed it left a lot to be desired. While the UVF did not formally endorse the Belfast Agreement, it did not oppose it and gave its members freedom to support or to reject it. However, as incidents such as Castlereagh, Miami gun-running, Colombia-three, and Stormontgate unfolded, Loyalists began to loose faith in the peace process. To many within the Loyalist community the implementation of the Agreement appeared to be essentially pro-Republican with a neutral British Government engaging in deals with Sinn Fein. The issue of parades, flags, and symbols of Britishness together with pressure at the Interfaces were further symptoms of this apparent drift in the peace process. Even for those Loyalists who had endorsed the Agreement, there is a feeling that what was being implemented in the name of the Agreement was vastly different from what they signed up to in 1998.

With no clear declaration that the war was over, with constant demands for inquiries to focus on British and Loyalist activities to mask Republican activities, and an ongoing campaign to divest Northern Ireland of symbols of Britishness, Loyalism entered the new millennium disillusioned with the political process. From 2000 – 2004 the two governments utilized the tactic of selective negotiations with Sinn Fein, SDLP and the UUP.

This process further isolated Loyalist political representatives to the detriment of the community peace process and their political influence within the Loyalist community. This was quite a blow to those who had negotiated the ceasefire to end reactionary Loyalist paramilitary violence. No reciprocation was given from Sinn Fein and no acknowledgement was given from either Governments or the Unionist establishment. This ultimately fostered Loyalist alienation from the process and poisoned the political climate of the new millennium.

From 1994 – 2004 the Loyalist ceasefire has been on a roller coaster ride as outside forces have unilaterally defined the term “ceasefire”. While the UVF has largely honoured its definition of the ceasefire as “no first strike” against the nationalist community, it has been involved in violent feuds with other Loyalist groups. In a recent newspaper interview the UVF acknowledged this but insisted that “if any of our members are attacked by dissident loyalists, republicans or others, we will not be taking into account any sanctions by the IMC or the Government against the PUP”. This statement clearly shows that while the influence of the PUP with the UVF may be significant it does have limitations - a truth that the Independent Monitoring Commission chose to ignore.

The IMC has also rejected and ridiculed the risk-taking work of the Progressive Unionist Party as a force for stability and has refused to acknowledge the information given to it by the PUP detailing the steps taken by the UVF leadership to discipline those of its members who had engaged in unsanctioned activities. It also chose to ignore the wealth of evidence available showing how the PUP and former UVF prisoners have sought to address many of the issues raised in its first report. For many observers this appears to reinforce the view held by many Loyalists that progressive Loyalism is an embarrassment that must be kept hidden until it can be killed off.

The rise in criminal activity and other anti-social activities in Loyalist communities has been, and continues to be, a cause for concern. The leadership of the UVF has stated that it does not wish to see its members take on the role of an informal ‘community police’ force and has endorsed community safety programmes and restorative justice initiatives that are genuinely representative of the community and have credible statutory sector support. The Progressive Unionist Party and former UVF prisoners are active in a broad range of programmes aimed at empowering local communities to address crime, anti-social behaviour, the drugs culture, alleged punishment attacks and sectarianism. The IMC, in keeping with the thinking of mainstream political opinion-makers, has failed to acknowledge this. To do so would run counter to the carefully constructed theory that nothing good or progressive can be found within Loyalism.

In conclusion, I believe that the UVF ceasefire declared in 1994 has been treated as essentially the poor relation of the Republican ceasefire and that progressive elements within Loyalism are being deliberately criminalised and demonised as a means of preventing the development of a vibrant working class political movement that will dare to assume ownership of its own political future. This is bound to generate frustration, anger and disenchantment with politics in Loyalist grass roots communities. Until this is effectively addressed there will be no guarantee of a genuine peace process developing.

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