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Issue No.17 Summer 2004
By Tommy McKearney Ten years after the world welcomed the ending of a twenty-five year long period of sustained hostilities in Northern Ireland, the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) issued a report finding that underground armies are still operational in the region. Moreover, agreement between the different political parties is clearly non-existent and prospects for meaningful local politics are bleak. What, we might well ask, has changed in the decade since the convoys of black taxis paraded joyously along the Falls Road? There
are, of course, serious questions being asked about the composition of
the IMC. The body was appointed unilaterally by the Irish and British
governments and its membership drawn from the heart of the Establishment.
Both republicans and loyalists have pointed to the fact that a Deputy
Director of the CIA and a former senior officer with Scotland Yards
Anti-Terrorist Squad are unlikely to take a broad view of conflict in
Ireland or are they likely to have the ability to view IRA activity as
anything other than subversive. Moreover, it would appear that the IMC
based its report on evidence collected from the security services and
did not consult with any of the organisations singled out for criticism
in its report. Another
major inadequacy with the IMC report was the fact that it failed to analyse
properly the absence of a consensus on policing. For far too long there
has been a view shared by Dublin and London that insisting upon support
for the police in Northern Ireland is similar to demanding that parents
behave responsibly. In other words, it appears to be taken as read
that police and policing are above reproach. Nowhere in the IMC report
is there any acknowledgement that if there isnt overwhelming support
for the police then objectively speaking, the police become part of the
problem. However questionable the composition and practice of the IMC,
it has to be accepted nevertheless that its headline assessment (that
the IRA, UVF etc., continue to exist and function) is a tautology. We
didnt need a commission to tell us what every punter on the street
knows. Nor indeed did these organisations ever pretend that they had ceased
to exist. In
spite of all this, the ceasefires have by and large held firm and most
people have grown used to a different situation where there is no longer
the daily fear of shootings, bombings and ubiquitous security. By a strange
paradox, the findings of the IMC in so far as they are accurate
- underline the extent of the ceasefires. Ten years ago the British and
Irish governments would not have considered it worthwhile appointing a
commission to comment on such a relatively small number of incidents nor
would it have raised any eyebrows to learn that the IRA was being held
responsible for a number of punishment beatings. Things have changed lately.
The
absence of widespread physical conflict has not however been replaced
by any significant meeting of minds between the communities in this area.
The Northern Ireland Assembly is in abeyance and appears destined to remain
so for some time. It is now being acknowledged, if only grudgingly, that
the end of the armed campaigns have not automatically led to conventional
political progress. A
quite unpleasant deduction to be drawn from this observation is the fact
that the absence of conventional politics in Northern Ireland was not
as a result of armed organisations or campaigns of physical force. Had
the overwhelming majority of people in the region been anxious to engage
in the normal practice of politics, the armed campaigns would have disrupted
life but not politics. The fact that normal politics are not
flourishing, after a ten year period that was largely free from armed
conflict must surely indicate that the gunmen were a symptom of the ailment
rather than the cause of it. Many
will argue, however, that the IMC report and the absence of total decommissioning
of arms is precisely the reason for the political breakdown. Such people
will say that it is a fear of a return to the old days that
prevents the normal functioning of the Northern Assembly. This is one
of those arguments that is difficult, if not impossible, to prove or disprove
since it would be virtually impossible to guarantee that underground organisations
have entirely decommissioned their invisible arsenals or that secret armies
have indeed disbanded. With such a focus on armed organisations that are
patently in peacetime mode, it is clear that a large number of people
are unwilling to swallow their reservations and make the compromises necessary
to have power sharing. On
the other hand it appears that in practice a majority within the non-unionist
community is quite happy to forego power sharing. By granting Sinn Fein
the majority position within nationalism the electorate ensured de facto
a breakdown in the Assembly. No one can dispute that people are perfectly
entitled to vote for whomsoever they like and that the onus for shared
government must rest on all elected representatives. Nevertheless, when
a majority of nationalists voted for the republicans it practically guaranteed
a DUP boycott. Of course the converse can be said of unionism; giving
the DUP a majority was giving them a mandate to reject any deal with republicans.
In
contrast to the absence of political movement since the ceasefire there
has been a very dramatic change in certain sectors of the Northern Irish
economy. House prices in the area are increasing at an incredible rate.
Pent-up demand coupled with speculative investment means that real estate
prices are now matching similar areas in Southern Ireland and Britain.
The difficulty though is that these booming sectors are not spread evenly
across the economy. There is an ever growing disparity between rich and
poor and peacetime conditions make this gap all the more obvious to the
under-privileged. The
decline in heavy industry and textile manufacturing has impacted most
severely in Protestant working-class communities and it is frequently
said that such areas have not noticed any improvement in their socio-economic
conditions over the past ten years. It should also be pointed out that
there is also unemployment and deprivation in nationalist working-class
districts as well. Visitors to Belfast are no longer confronted quite
so starkly with the evidence of security or a city divided between nationalists
and unionists. The old divisions undoubtedly remain and some are
as vicious as ever but what is now even more obvious to the outside
observer is the gap between prosperous Belfast and marginalised, unemployed
Belfast. To
a certain extent the ten years since the ceasefires have made Northern
Ireland resemble Britain more than ever before and in the worst possible
way. With the emergence of a prosperous and brash new middle-class sharing
the area with an increasing marginalised community, Northern Ireland has
taken on many of the features of contemporary, post-industrial Britain.
The
great majority of people in the area have welcomed the ceasefires and
there is no desire whatsoever for a return to the days of armed conflict.
However, there is no commensurate endorsement of a local political process
and, crucially, Northern Ireland remains deprived of a consensus. All
the while socio-economic deprivation festers away almost unnoticed by
all apart from those who are experiencing it. The ceasefires have been a Godsend in terms of saving life and limb but have not proven to be the panacea for all our problems as some predicted in 1994.
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