Issue No.15 Winter 2003

An overview of options


By Tommy McKearney


With respected ‘London Times’ columnist Simon Jenkins describing the Good Friday Agreement as ‘brain-dead’, the time is opportune to review the various options that might be considered as an alternative to the current political impasse


Following the debacle that occurred on Tuesday 21st October when it proved impossible to secure a consensus leading to the re-establishment of a Stormont based Executive, the British and Irish governments began working frantically to repair the damage. After a series of breakdowns, suspensions and postponements, we could be forgiven for thinking that there is a Humpty Dumpty element connected to the Northern Ireland ‘Institutions’. In spite of the intensive efforts of London/Dublin and many people here, there is at least a case to be made for judging the Good Friday Agreement and the institutions emanating from it to be, as Simon Jenkins of the Times said on BBC Radio Ulster, ‘brain-dead’.


Some may view this as unduly pessimistic or incorrect. We are, nevertheless fast approaching a situation where the onus must surely be on supporters of the Agreement to prove not that it is a worthy effort but that it is a viable product. Not only is there abundant evidence of breakdown but we are now hearing the scepticism of young people as to the nature of the enterprise. On a recent UTV political debate (Insight, 6th Nov. 2003) a young unionist voter challenged Mark Durkan’s assertion that the Agreement is not open for re-negotiation. The young unionist tellingly pointed out that significant aspects of the deal have already been re-negotiated. This continuous round of amending, changing and re-drafting clearly encourages the protagonists to engage in endless haggling in order to either secure a unilateral advantage for their own party or to cause discomfort for the opposition. The process is best described now as existing in a state of hysteresis rather than one with momentum and dynamic.


It would be rational, therefore to do as Simon Jenkins suggested and ask ourselves whether a reasonable alternative to the current process exists. After ten years of intensive deliberating, negotiating, orchestrating, choreographing etc., there undoubtedly is little appetite for a further round of the same. Moreover, after ten years of relative peace there would be a very understandable reluctance to risk this new found tranquillity by entering into the unknown. Yet, pottering about and hoping for the best must be an equally risky proposition given the history of this part of the world. The window of opportunity – to engage in alternative thinking – may not last for much longer. As memories of the past fade, a new generation may not be so determined to avoid physical conflict and thus cause the circle to turn through a full rotation.
This magazine has a policy of seeking out alternative opinion. There are alternative views about how progress can best be made. It would be a tremendous help to all of us if we were not to confine our thinking to one option only. Henry Ford’s any colour so long as it is black is now seen as laughable and any solution so long as it is the GFA may eventually draw the same derision.


While we all have personal opinions and preferences, it would be contradictory to advocate a wide-ranging debate that would examine a range of options while simultaneously insisting on a one-option outcome. All proposals deserve to be put in the public domain and rigorously scrutinised.


Most agree that settlements fall into two broad categories, namely those that lie within the United Kingdom and those that don’t. The proffered settlement most familiar to us is the model of devolved government within the United Kingdom. In essence this is what was envisaged under the Good Friday Agreement. Ominously it was also what was originally envisaged under the government of Ireland Act 1920 that established a Northern Ireland parliament in the first place. The difference that is supposed to separate the old pre 1973 concept and the current Good Friday Agreement is the factor of agreed power sharing. The weakness in this concept is that in the absence of agreement to share power by all the principal constituencies, the arrangement must either resort to what is now seen as unacceptable – majority rule as in pre-73 Stormont – or collapse.


In the event of devolved government collapsing the settlement then becomes one of direct rule from London. A lot of unionist people view this as a very tolerable option. The administration of affairs is seen to work and the endless and unseemly bickering that is part and parcel of a local assembly is mercifully absent from people’s lives and television screens. The difficulty of course is that in the long-term a small and insignificant little region, far from London and on the periphery of the UK receives the treatment – or lack of it- that comes with being irrelevant to the great issues of a major power. The case for separatism is often as well made by insensitive bureaucrats in London as by diehard republicans in Ireland.


In light of these difficulties, some have proposed independence for the six counties of Northern Ireland. The immediate reaction to this is often derision but this overlooks the fact that other countries such as Luxemburg, Monaco or (say it softly) – the Vatican- are smaller in area and population than Northern Ireland. Furthermore, the European Union now provides us with a new model for co-operation among states willing to pool their sovereignty and this obviates many of the old requirements of independence. The difficulty does nevertheless remain that since inhabitants of this region cannot agree on a devolved government within the United Kingdom, there is no clear evidence that they could agree on a form of government if left to themselves. Clearly too, the governments of Britain and the Republic would be unwilling to create a situation that might lead to conflict on a greater scale than that previously witnessed.
One significant advantage of the independence option, though, is that it makes Northern Ireland an area governed neither by London or Dublin. The benefit in this case is that neither community feels itself to be dominated by an external authority while providing for a large measure of local autonomy.


Elements of this thinking emerge in the federal Ireland option. Although classically an option envisaging an island wide arrangement, proponents of the federal Ireland argue that this takes account of protestant/unionist sensitivities and fears of domination from Dublin. The fact that some influential loyalists in the early 1970’s felt that a federal solution might possibly be made compatible with their mooted con-federal proposal indicates that this option may have greater potential than many realise. The major difficulty, however, lies in persuading unionists that they might feel comfortable in a nine county (rather than six county) Ulster.


There does of course remain many who still view the creation of one unitary and independent state on this island as the best option. With recent economic developments south of the border there are no longer many good economic reasons for opposing such a settlement. Moreover, changing social mores in the republic have rendered obsolete the old fear of home rule being Rome rule. The major difficulty remains, as always, securing agreement from the unionist population for this option.


A final possibility is the suggestion for joint sovereignty. By its very nature this would have to be a transient arrangement and while perhaps addressing immediate and urgent issues, would most likely alienate all sides equally and simultaneously undermine the authority of the London and Dublin governments.


The above list is not exhaustive. Others may have different ideas for the better government of the region. If so we would all profit by hearing them. In the meantime, it would help if we would open our minds to the range of possibilities that already exist and give serious consideration to the fact that political creativity can have a positive and beneficial influence on difficult situations.


The views expressed by our contributors are their own and do not necessarily reflect that of the editorial committee.


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